The perception and memory of faces have been accounted for by the processing of two kinds of facial information: featural and con gurational. The starting point of this article is the de nition and accepted usage of these two concepts of facial information. I discuss these de nitions and their various rami cations from three aspects: methodological, theoretical and empirical. In the section on methodology, I review several of the basic manipulations for changing facial information. In the theoretical section, I consider four fundamental hypotheses associated with these two kinds of facial information: the featural, con gurational, holistic and norm hypotheses (the norm-based hypothesis and the 'hierarchy of schemas' hypothesis). In the section on empirical evidence, I survey relevant studies on the topic and consider these hypotheses through a description of various empirical phenomena that carry clear implications for the subject of the study. In conclusion, I propose two alternative directions for future research: rst, a 'taskinformation' approach, which involves specifying what information is used for different tasks; and secondly, taking a different approach to the de nition of the visual features for face processing, for example by using principal components analysis (PCA).
In the last 20 years an enormous research effort has been focused on perception and memory of faces. One central question has focused on how faces are analysed and represented in memory-as features or as con gurations. The present article concentrates on an analysis of these different kinds of facial information, and their place in the perception of a face and its recognition. Other issues that arise in the face perception area (e.g. the modularity question, neurophysiological studies and computer modelling) are addressed only insofar as they are essential for understanding the topic of the present study (e.g. Ellis & Young, 1989; Nachson, 1995) . I focus on conceptual issues and their relation to empirical data gathered from human laboratory experiments.
The starting point is the de nition and accepted usage of the following two terms in facial information: I de ne featural information in reference to isolated facial features in everyday use-hair, brow, eyes, nose, mouth, cheeks and chin; and con gurational information in reference to the spatial relations between the features, their interaction, and to various proportions, such as nose length to brow length or brow area to face area (Bruce, 1988; Diamond & Carey, 1986; Garner, 1978; Rhodes, Brake, & Atkinson, 1993; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996; Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997) .
In the subsequent sections I discuss these de nitions and their various rami cations from three viewpoints: methodological, theoretical and empirical. In the methodological section, I survey several of the basic manipulations for changing facial information. In the theoretical section, I consider four basic hypotheses associated with featural information and con gurational information: the featural, con gurational, holistic and norm hypotheses (the norm-based hypothesis and the 'hierarchy of schemas' hypothesis). In the section on empirical research, I review the relevant material. As few studies have attempted to compare the different hypotheses (because some of them were developed in the course of the research work), I discuss these hypotheses while describing the empirical ndings.
Finally, in the Discussion, I examine the following two basic questions: can one propose which is more important-featural or con gurational facial information? My answer is both. And, of all the hypotheses considered, can we determine the one hypothesis that is the most ef cient (i.e. that explains all or most of the ndings)? My answer is no. These conclusions are supported by the following analysis. First, I discuss the relationship between the four hypotheses and the ndings, and then I propose four dif culties in concluding which hypothesis is the most ef cient. Secondly, based on the above, I propose for future research an outline of the task-information approach, for dealing with the complex interactions between facial information and memory tasks. Thirdly, I discuss another approach for future research, that of the 'principal component analysis' (PCA). It presents a new way for handling facial information including featural and con gurational information.
Methodology: Some basic manipulations
In this section, I examine some of the main experimental manipulations associated with featural information and con gurational information. (Other manipulations, such as pixelization and darkening, are discussed in the empirical evidence section.) These are depicted in Fig. 1 . Figure 1 shows seven examples of facial transformations concerning the distinction between featural information and con gurational information. With spacing, we alter the distance between the facial dimensions or features, for example increasing the distance between the eyes, and increasing the distance between the nose and the mouth.
Although this variable seems to be one of the most important variables for examining con gurational information, a rather dif cult problem arises here, which I call the 'intrinsic connection' (e.g. Bruce, 1988; Haig, 1984; Rhodes et al., 1993; Sergent, 1984) . For example, a change in the distance between the eyes (a con gurational change) may well be perceived as a change in the nasal bridge, namely a featural change; and vice versa, broadening of the nose may be perceived as a change in the spatial relations between the features, namely a con gurational change.
With sizing we change the size of a facial feature, for example enlarging the nose. A change in the size of the nose obviously also changes the spatial relations of the features. With feature exchange, we change or replace facial features. In Fig. 1 the nose has been replaced. Here we should point out once again that the change in the feature changes the spatial relations between the features.
With isolated presentation, we show isolated facial features, without the facial setting. In Fig. 1 the nose is shown alone. This presentation of a single facial value omits all the spatial relations, namely the con gurational information.
With jumbled face, we change the places of the facial features. In Fig. 1 the positions of the eyes and the mouth have been exchanged. Again, it is worth noting that this change entails substantial changes in the spatial relations of the facial features.
With local inversion, we invert isolated features while maintaining their position in the face. In Fig. 1 we have inverted the eyes and the mouth, and we get the famous Thatcher illusion (e.g. Thompson, 1980) . Here, too, the change involves a change in the spatial relations of the features.
With holistic inversion, we invert the entire face. This operation, despite the enormous in uence on face recognition, does not change the spatial relations among the facial features.
Theoretical approaches
These experimental manipulations and others (see below) address the following four main hypotheses: (1) the featural hypothesis; (2) the con gurational hypothesis; (3) the holistic hypothesis; and (4) the norm hypotheses (the norm-based hypothesis and the 'hierarchy of schemas' hypothesis). I describe them brie y in this section. In the following section on empirical evidence, I expand on the treatment of these hypotheses, and discuss other hypotheses (e.g. parallel processing and spatial frequencies) as well.
The featural hypothesis
This posits that we perceive and remember faces chie y by means of facial features. For example, we say that this is a picture of the face of Cyrano de Bergerac because only he has such a big nose; or that only one woman in the world has such an enchanting mysterious smile-Mona Lisa. The face as a whole is perceived only as the sum of features, and the face is nothing but the joining of isolated facial features. (Garner, 1978 , calls the whole that is no more than the sum of its parts the 'simple whole'.) The methods of face reconstruction, such as the photo-t and the identikit, are close to this approach. Penry (1971) , the inventor of the photo-t, writes: 'Because each facial part is the sum of its individual details and the whole face is the sum of its sections, the total assessment of it requires a careful visual addition' (p. 101). Still, it is worth emphasizing that Penry did not entirely disregard the fact that the sum of facial features also creates something more, namely a new con guration. While he believes that a given face is a particular combination of individual features, he also suggests that 'in an otherwise similar pro le the substitution of only one feature greatly alters the whole facial appearance. Whenever there is even a one-feature difference, the eye is tricked into assuming that the entire facial outline is different ' (p. 14) . Hence, Penry is a featural theorist who admits that con gurational processing plays some role in face perception.
The con gurational hypothesis
This holds that we perceive and remember faces by means of two kinds of information, namely featural and con gurational, where the importance of the latter is generally conceived of as greater than of the former (e.g. Bartlett & Searcy, 1993; Diamond & Carey, 1986; Garner, 1978; Rhodes et al., 1993; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996) . Diamond and Carey (1986) proposed this hypothesis, among other things, as a solution to the facial inversion effect and as an alternative to the hypothesis that facial information is processed through a special cognitive mechanism. They stress that faces are visual forms 'sharing the same con guration'-hair above brow above eyes, and so on. Not all visual forms share the same con guration. Landscapes, for example, are not given this quality as one scene may include water and sky and another houses and trees. Visual forms that do not share the same con guration are distinguishable by ' rst order relational properties' (1st-orp), namely according to the spatial relations between similar parts that constitute them (e.g. the relation between a house and a tree). In faces the 1st-orp is constrained by a common con gurational pattern, and therefore it is possible to distinguish faces by the spatial relations between the facial elements that de ne the shared con guration. . (In Fig. 1 , jumbling a face alters 1st-orp, while spacing alters to 2nd-orp). This idea of Diamond and Carey offers a solution to the problem known as the 'homogeneity problem': if all faces share a common con guration, how is it possible to distinguish so many faces?
In a similar way, Rhodes (1988) differentiated rst-order features characterized as those that may be described independently from other parts of the face (e.g. eyes, nose, mouth) from second-order features, characterized by the spatial relation between them, their position on the face and the shape of the face. (Rhodes also de ned higher-level features as a complex group such as age, sex and weight. Garner, 1978 , regards the kinds of information created by the spatial relations of parts of the whole as con gurational properties, for example symmetry and repetition.)
Despite the similarity between Diamond and Carey's approach and that of Rhodes, the story is not simple. The main reason is the concept of 'shared con guration' suggested by Diamond and Carey. This concept presents a different view of the notion of con guration. According to this view, con guration is understood as a process that compares a face to a facial norm, that comes from learning and acquiring skill in perceiving and remembering faces. Rhodes and Tremewan (1994) differentiated two kinds of con gurational information: one referring to the spatial relations between features, and the other to the coding of the information of a given face in relation to the facial norm (see below).
The holistic hypothesis
According to this hypothesis, we perceive and remember faces by using two kinds of information-featural and con gurational-where these kinds are perceived as a single entity, the whole face. This perceptual wholeness is dif cult to break down into its parts without seriously harming perception and remembering a face and its parts. The holistic hypothesis has two interpretations concerning the relation between feature information and con gurational information. According to the accessibility interpretation, the whole face is more accessible in the memory than its parts; according to the con gurational coding interpretation, con gurational information is more important than featural information-an interpretation not greatly different from the preceding hypothesis (e.g. Farah, 1992; Farah, Tanaka, & Drain, 1995; Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997) . (For a different interpretation of the holistic hypothesis that views a face as a unit, a facial Gestalt, see Searcy and Bartlett, 1996) .
The norm hypotheses
Research in the concepts of norm, prototype and schema has a long and complex history (see discussion in Komatsu, 1992; Rhodes, 1996) . For present purposes I distinguish two variant hypotheses on the concept of norm.
Norm-based hypothesis
According to the (prototype) norm hypothesis, all facial information, featural and con gurational, is presented in a cognitive system as deviations from the norm, as distances from the abstract prototype face. These deviations emphasize the featural or the con gurational qualities of a given face with respect to the norm (e.g. Rhodes, 1996; Rhodes et al., 1993; Rhodes, Brennan, & Carey, 1987; Rhodes, Carey, Byatt, & Prof tt, 1998; Valentine, 1991a Valentine, , 1991b . The idea of a facial norm and deviations from it can be seen in the way that computerized caricatures are made. Brennan (1985) developed the following technique. First, a true drawing of a speci c face is made by marking the outline of the picture of the face at many critical points, which are then connected by lines. Next, a facial norm is created by computation of an average of a large number of such drawings according to age, sex, race and so on. Finally, the drawing of a target face is compared with the norm, the average face. The comparison makes it possible to create caricatures by enlargement of the distances between the target face and the norm, and anti-caricatures by reducing these distances. While caricatures increase con gurational qualities of a given face as compared with the facial norm, anticaricatures decrease these con gurational qualities. (For other procedures for creating norms or prototypes, see Perrett, 1991, 1993) . Following Goldstein and Chance (1980) , Rakover (1999) , Rakover and Teucher (1997) , Vernon (1955) , Wiseman and Neisser (1974) and Yuille (1991) , I suggest the hierarchy of schemas hypothesis. The hypothesis suggests that many complex multidimensional stimuli are processed according to existing schemas in the cognitive system. Face recognition depends on a schema of the whole face that contains schemas of features. One of the important components of the whole face schema is the spatial order of the internal facial features: eyes above nose above mouth. (This is why, for example, we see faces in clouds or in ambiguous pictures (e.g. Wiseman & Neisser, 1974) .) Similar arrangements also exist in schemas of facial features. For example, the schema of the eyes is based on the order eyebrows above eye in which there is a pupil. The facial information is processed and meaningfully arranged according to these schemas when the perception of the whole face determines the perception of the individual features. (Several researchers suggest that general or global perceptual processing precedes processing of the parts of the whole, for example Bruce, 1988 , Navon, 1977 , Peressotti, Rumiati, Nicoletti, and Job, 1991 .
Hierarchy of schemas
These two hypotheses assume abstract facial concepts-norm and schemawhereby the cognitive system deals with faces. The main difference between them is that while the norm-based hypothesis suggests that the face is coded in respect of the norm, as deviations from the norm, the hierarchy of schemas hypothesis suggests that perception and memory of the facial stimulus are accomplished according to schemas (see also on the schema as a search-directing process in Gyoba, Arimura, & Maruyama, 1980; Neisser, 1976; Palmer, 1975 Palmer, , 1977 .
In sum, while all these hypotheses refer to both featural and con gurational information, the differences among them are a matter of emphasis. The featural hypothesis emphasizes greatly the importance of featural information in the perception and memory of faces; the con gurational hypothesis emphasizes con gurational information; the holistic hypothesis uni es both types of information in a face template; the norm-based hypotheses conceives both types of information in terms of deviations from the norm-face; and the hierarchy of schemas conceives these types of information as organized in schemas of a face and its features.
Empirical evidence
The various hypotheses described in the previous section on representation and processing of facial information have been tested in a number of empirical studies. However, many of these do not attempt to distinguish these hypotheses empirically. A major aim is to substantiate the in uence of con gurational information in a controlled experiment. Sergent (1984) argues that although most researchers believe that the face is processed wholly, as one unit, there is little experimental evidence in support of the con gurational hypothesis. Much empirical material connected with the question of facial feature salience may in fact be interpreted as supporting the featural hypothesis (e.g. Rakover & Cahlon, 1989 , 1999 Rakover & Teucher, 1997; Shepherd, Davies, & Ellis, 1981) . Indirect empirical evidence in support of the con gurational hypothesis is found in experiments showing that recall of faces judged holistically (e.g. participants judge the face according to its degree of likability and honesty) is better than faces judged according to the physical qualities of their features (e.g. Bower & Karlin, 1974; Patterson & Baddeley, 1977) ; in experiments on the perception of facial expression (Ekman, 1972) ; or in experiments showing that face recognition is maintained even when the contours of the features are blurred (Harmon, 1973) . As stated, then, the purpose of many of the experiments described below is to exemplify the importance of con gurational information, and to refute the featural hypothesis. The empirical phenomena reported here are organized more or less in terms of their historical origins and the complexity of the experimental manipulation supporting the featural, con gurational, holistic or norm hypotheses.
Feature exchange
In this series of experiments the participant is shown a pair of faces (simultaneously or successively). The participant's task is to decide if the two faces are the same, similar or different, where some of the pairs were the same and some were different in one or more features. The results were analysed according to various models (e.g. if the participant scans the face serially, feature by feature, or if he or she examines the face in parallel), and the overall conclusion is not unequivocal: some of the experiments support the featural hypotheses, some the con gurational, and some both (e.g. Bradshaw & Wallace, 1971; Matthews, 1978; Smith & Nielsen, 1970 ; see review and discussion in Bruce, 1988; Sergent, 1984) .
As examples, let us examine the experiments of Tversky and Krantz (1969) and of Sergent (1984) . Tversky and Krantz showed the participants one or two pairs of schematic faces distinguished by three components: eyes, mouth and face shape. Participants had to (1) grade the degree of dissimilarity between the two faces appearing in one pair, and (2) grade which of the two pairs showed a greater degree of dissimilarity between the faces in a pair. Analysis of the results showed that the total degree of dissimilarity between the faces was nicely explained by simple addition of the degree of dissimilarity of the components of a face. That is, the result strongly supported the featural hypothesis.
Sergent likewise presented pairs of schematic faces differentiated by three dimensions: eyes, chin and spatial relations between the internal features of the face. The participant had to (1) grade the degree of dissimilarity between the two faces in a pair, and (2) decide for each pair if it was the same or different, where the pairs appeared in upright or inverse orientation. Analysis of the dissimilarity data showed, in contrast to Tversky and Kranz, that the general impression of the face could not be explained by simple addition of the parts of the face. Analysis of reaction time (RT) showed that the eyes and the chin were processed independently. But this was not the case for the spatial relations dimension. When the face was shown in upright orientation, an interaction was produced between the spatial relations and the two other dimensions, expressed as reduction of RT. Such an interactive effect was not found when the faces were shown inverted. As con gurational information is based on mutual in uence, namely interaction between the facial features, these results were interpreted as supporting both hypotheses-the featural (mainly in faces shown in inverse orientation) and the con gurational (mainly faces shown upright). (See also Takane and Sergent, 1983) .
Spacing and sizing
In this series of experiments the participant is shown faces in which changes are made in the distance between the features and in the size of the features. These transformations are thought to change con gurational information (see Fig. 1 ). Several studies found that these manipulations systematically in uenced face perception and recognition, ndings that are interpreted as supporting the con gurational hypothesis. Haig (1984) showed participants a series of unknown faces, on which the above transformations were made, in a face recognition task. He found that participants were very sensitive to slight changes in the distances between facial features, for example the reduction of the distance between the eyes greatly affected recognition of the original face. Haig (1984 Haig ( , 1986 ) also found that changes in facial features and the relations between them produced the perception of a new face (for a similar effect see Penry, 1971, p. 14) . Hosie, Ellis, and Haig (1988) asked participants to grade the degree of similarity between a familiar target face and a face that had undergone transformation. They found that the degree of dissimilarity increased with the degree of distortion of the face, and spacing and sizing of the internal facial features impaired recognition of the target face more than changes in the external features. Rhodes (1988) obtained ratings of facial features and similarity judgments of faces performed by participants in her experiment, and measures of distances among facial features; she then analysed the data by a multidimensional technique. The results supported the hypothesis that faces are processed by employing both featural (eyes, nose and mouth) and con gurational (spatial relations among facial features) information.
Recently, however, Macho and Leder (1998) found that facial features are processed independently. They varied eye separation, width of nose and size of mouth and discovered that similarity judgments (whether a test face is more similar to one of two target faces) are based on a single feature and are not affected by the interaction between features.
Low spatial frequencies
Any spatial pattern, including the human face, can be viewed as a blend of a number of simple sine waves, characterized by their spatial frequency, direction and amplitude. Harmon (1973) and Harmon and Julesz (1973) suggested that the facial information required to identify a face is located in the range of low spatial frequencies. These frequencies do not show the details of the face but its general con guration. To test the hypothesis, they eliminated high frequencies by a technique called blocking, quantization or pixelization. The face is divided into a network of pixels (a pixel is a small area possessing a uniform degree of greyness). As the number of pixels increased, so did the degree of distinctiveness of the facial details and high spatial frequencies; as the number of pixels decreased, the blurring of the face and low spatial frequencies increased. Harmon and Julesz reduced the number of pixels by dividing the face into a network of squares, each containing a number of pixels. The degree of greyness of each square was calculated as the average of degrees of greyness of the pixels that composed it. Despite this, Harmon and Julesz found that the face could still be identi ed.
The great amount of research that followed the studies of Harmon and Julesz did not decisively support the hypothesis. The main ndings were that facial identi cation requires a wide range of spatial frequencies; and that as blocking is greater (i.e. the size of the squares in the network increases) or the elimination of high spatial frequencies rise, the degree of identi cation of the face decreases, so that from a certain lower boundary, identi cation is entirely random (see e.g. Bachmann, 1991; Bruce, 1988; Costen, Parker, & Craw, 1994 Fiorentini, Maffei, & Sandini, 1983; Sergent, 1986; Uttal, Baruch, & Allen, 1997) .
The composite face effects
This series of experiments concerns the perception and memory of a face composed of parts of two different faces. Young, Hellawell, and Hay (1987) showed a participant a face composed of two parts taken from two different faces of two famous people: the upper part of the face (from the middle of the nose to the hair) was taken from one face and the lower part (from the middle of the nose to the chin) was taken from another face. The participant's task was to identify the upper part of the face. The ndings showed that identi cation of the upper parts of the composite face was dif cult. In contrast, identi cation of the upper part alone, of the inverted composite face, or of the upper part in the composite face in which the two parts were misaligned, was relatively easier. These ndings were interpreted as supporting the con gurational hypothesis, namely an interaction occurs between features that changes their perception, so that the perception of the upper part of the face in the composite face is different from the perception of this part in isolation. Inversion of the face and misalignment impaired the con gurational perception, and as a consequence identi cation of the upper part in these two conditions was easier.
This result was replicated with schematic faces (e.g. Endo, Masame, & Kinya, 1989; Endo, Masame, & Maruyama, 1990) and with unknown faces (e.g. Hole, 1994) . Hole notes that Young et al. (1987) did indeed attempt to check if the composite face effect could be generalized to unknown faces, but in his opinion their procedure was based on preliminary practice, which made the unknown face familiar. Therefore, Hole showed participants pairs of unknown faces, in some of which the upper part of the two faces of the pair was the same. These pairs were shown upright and inverted. The participants had to decide as quickly as possible if the upper part in each pair was the same or different. The results replicated the ndings of Young et al. (i.e . the RT for a pair shown upright was longer than for a pair shown inverted), but only when the duration of exposure of the faces was 80 ms; when the exposure was 2 s, the effect was not obtained. Hole suggests that long exposure time allows feature-by-feature comparison, while short exposure time forces the participant to use the con gurational strategy of perceiving the face as a whole.
Reinitz and his colleagues (e.g Reinitz, Lammers, & Cochran, 1992; Reinitz, Morrissery, & Demb, 1994) showed at the learning stage a series of line drawings of faces, and at the test stage different kinds of faces, among them 'conjunction faces'-namely faces shown at the rst stage of the experiment and composed of the inner part of one face and the outer part of another. The participants' task was to decide if the face they were shown was old or new. The ndings (e.g. recognition of an old face was far better than recognition of a conjunction face) were interpreted as supporting the following hypothesis: featural information and con gurational information are coded independently, where coding of con gurational information requires a greater investment of attention than coding of featural information.
Inversion effects
Memory of faces shown inverted holistically (chin above, hair below) is impaired in comparison with memory of faces shown upright. Compared with upright faces, the impairment in recognition of inverted faces reaches about 25%. Moreover, the decline in recognition of inverted faces is greater than the decline in recognition of other inverted objects, such as houses and aeroplanes (e.g. Yin, 1969 ; see review and discussion in Valentine, 1988) .
This series of experiments investigates not only the effect of holistic inversion on face recognition itself, but also the in uence of this variable on diverse facial transformations such as spacing, sizing, feature exchange and the like, depicted in Fig. 1 . Diamond and Carey (1986) explained the inversion effect as follows. When the face is presented upright, the participant's perception is based on two kinds of information, featural and con gurational, but when it is presented inverted, his or her perception is based mainly on featural information. This difference in information processing explains the impaired recognition of the inverted face. That is, the inversion effect is explained not by a speci c facial cognitive system, but by expertise-speci cally, people's expertise with the human face. As supporting evidence, Diamond and Carey show that the inversion effect in pictures of dogs (body pro les) occurs only in expert dog-handlers. People who are not experts with dogs have not learned the con gurational information associated with the spatial relations between the various features of a dog.
This research led to several studies that supported the con gurational hypothesis. These studies tested whether holistic inversion removes only facial changes caused by other variables (such as spacing and the Margaret Thatcher illusion), considered con gurational variables. Rhodes et al. (1993) found that inversion of a face harmed con gurational information, which was activated in the experiment by changing the distance between facial features and the creation of the Thatcher illusion (local inversion) more than in a jumbled face and isolated presentation of facial features. Since the rst two facial changes are con gurational, it is especially signi cant that holistic inversion of the face speci cally harms recognition of faces that have undergone spacing and local inversion. Bartlett and Searcy (1993) , like Rhodes et al. (1993) , found that inversion of a face lowers the degree of grotesqueness aroused by faces with local inversion (Thatcherized faces) and faces that have undergone spacing. Inversion did not change the degree of grotesqueness of faces possessing emotionally grotesque expressions. Searcy and Bartlett (1996) likewise found that while holistic inversion of a face reduced the degree of grotesqueness aroused by faces subjected to spacing, inversion did not affect faces that had undergone a change in features alone, such as distortion of the eyes or the teeth. Similarly, Leder and Bruce (1998a) found that while holistic inversion reduced the distinctiveness bene t gained in ratings and memory for faces subjected to changing con gural features such as eye distance, inversion did not affect faces subjected to local changes such as thickening and darkening the eyebrow.
These experimental results were interpreted as supporting the con gurational hypothesis which suggests that facial information is coded in a dual manner, by two different processes, namely featural and con gurational. Faces shown upright are coded dually with emphasis on con gurational information, and inverted faces are coded featurally. Holistic inversion, then, eliminates (or considerably diminishes) con gurational information. That is, holistic inversion eliminates the effect of con gurational variables (e.g. spacing and local inversion), but does not affect featural variables (e.g. isolated presentation, feature exchange and feature distortion). Furthermore, Searcy and Bartlett (1996) suggest that this differential effect of holistic inversion does not correspond with the holistic hypothesis (which proposes that the face is presented in the cognitive system as a single whole unit), because according to this hypothesis inversion should impede coding of both con gurational and featural information. (They argue that this differential effect does not correspond with other hypotheses either, such as Valentine's theory (1988 Valentine's theory ( , 1991a , because these theories also posit a similar effect of inversion on the two kinds of facial information. See also Leder and Bruce, 1998b) .
Similarly, Bruce (1998b, 2000) propose that face recognition is better explained by appeal to spatial relation between single features (e.g. nose-mouth distance, distance between the eyes) than by appeal to holistic processing. If a face is distinguished by the distance between the eyes, then it has been found that recognition of this face, when its two eyes are shown alone, is better than when one eye is shown within the context of the whole face. Hence, exclusion of an essential part of a spatial relation is not compensated by the context. Clearly, the interpretation of the above empirical evidence depends on the assumption that holistic inversion does indeed impair con gurational information. For this reason, Rakover's experiments that cast doubt on the validity of this assumption are important. Rakover and Teucher (1997) showed that holistic inversion of individual facial features (especially hair and brow, and eyes, which are the most salient features) impairs recognition similarly to inversion of the entire face. That is, elimination of spatial relations between features is not a condition for the inversion effect. Moreover, it became clear that it is possible to predict with a fairly high degree of accuracy the recognition of a whole face (upright or inverted) with a formula based on recognition of isolated features. (But see a review and experiments that found it dif cult to obtain the inversion effect with isolated features in Rhodes et al., 1993, and Bruce, 2000) .
Furthermore, in contrast with the con gurational hypothesis, Rakover (1999) found that holistic inversion does not reduce the feeling of strangeness (created by the Margaret Thatcher illusion) in all the variations of the illusion (created by local inversion of eyebrows, eyes, and both features together) in regular faces and in jumbled faces. Moreover, in accordance with Valentine and Bruce (1985) , he found that holistic inversion of a jumbled face not only does not reduce strangeness, it greatly increases it.
Whole and part effects
This series of experiments serves to support the holistic hypothesis that the face with all its parts is represented as a single whole in a cognitive system. Farah (1992) and Tanaka and Farah (1993) inferred from the holistic hypothesis that recognition of an isolated facial feature (e.g. eyes, nose, mouth) is better in the case where the feature is shown in the context of the entire face than when it is shown in isolation, or where the con gurational information of the original face has been changed. In the rst stage of the experiment, participants learned names (e.g. Larry) for different faces. In the second stage they were shown, for example, (1) two isolated and different noses and the experimenters asked which of the two noses belonged to Larry, and (2) two faces identical except for the noses (the two noses that had appeared in (1)), and the experimenters asked which of the pair of faces belonged to Larry. Recognition in (2) was better than in (1). Furthermore, recognition in (2) was better than in cases where an inverted or jumbled face was shown. In the two latter cases there was no difference in recognition between isolated presentation of the feature and when the feature was shown in the context of the whole face. These researchers also found that this effect, called the 'whole/part advantage (effect)', was not obtained in the case of houses, where the participant was asked to decide which house or door was Larry's. A recent study, however, which replicated the whole/part advantage for faces, also obtained the same advantage for houses. This nding may indicate that houses are also processed holistically (see Donnelly & Davidoff, 1999 ; see also Davidoff & Donnelly, 1990) .
Additionally, Tanaka and Sengco (1997) found that recognition of eyes in the setting of the original face was better than in a facial setting where the eyes were placed farther apart or close together (an experimental effect called the 'old/new con gurational advantage'), and better than in the case where the eyes were shown in isolation. Moreover, the spatial change in the eyes affected other features, such as the nose and the mouth, for which they obtained effects similar to the effects with the eyes. These differences disappeared when the face was shown inverted or when houses were shown instead of faces. Farah et al. (1995) taught participants in the rst stage of the experiment names of faces under two conditions: (1) the face was shown in whole, and (2) the face was shown in parts (external features, eyes, nose and mouth). In the second stage they showed participants whole faces upright or inverted, and asked them to give their names. While there was no difference between the upright and inverted faces when in the rst stage the face had been shown in parts, identi cation of the upright face was better than of the inverted face when in the rst stage the face had been shown wholly. (A similar effect was obtained for patterns of dots. See also Tanaka and Farah, 1991) . Farah et al. (1998) show in same-different matching experiments that faces are represented holistically. For example, similarity judgment of a nose in a pair of faces is affected by the perception of the whole face; and by a mask consisting of a whole face more than a mask made of parts of a face (a jumbled face). The masks followed a brief presentation of a pair of target faces. These holistic effects have been obtained in upright faces but not in inverted faces, words or houses. These experiments are particularly important because they show directly that faces are perceived and encoded holistically.
Similar to these are other experimental effects, namely the face superiority effect, in which recognition of part of the face (nose) was found to be better when in the rst stage the nose had been shown in the setting of a normal face than in the setting of a jumbled face (e.g. Homa, Haver, & Schwartz, 1976) ; object superiority effect, in which parts of faces or chairs were recognized better when they appeared in the setting of a whole face or object than in the setting of a jumbled face or object, or in isolation (e.g. Davidoff & Donnelly, 1990) ; and the face detection effect, where a visual pattern of a normal face was detected as a face faster than a jumbled face (e.g. Purcell & Stewart, 1988) .
Caricatures
As previously stated, while anti-caricatures reduce the uniqueness of a face, caricatures magnify the special way in which a certain face differs from the facial norm (the average face). Caricatures sharpen and highlight the spatial relations, namely the con guration characteristic of a given face. A large number of ndings support this hypothesis: there are caricatures that are recognized as well as veridical representations of the face, and are better recognized than anti-caricatures (a phenomenon called 'caricature equivalence'); and there are caricatures that are better recognized than veridical representations (a phenomenon called 'caricature advantage' or the 'superportrait effect') (e.g. Benson & Perrett, 1991 Carey, 1992; Rhodes, 1996; Rhodes & Tremewan, 1994; Stevenage, 1995a Stevenage, , 1995b . In addition, Stevenage (1995b) found that identi cation of a picture of a target face at the test stage was better if at the rst stage participants had learned to name a caricature of this face than if at the rst stage they had learned to name a veridical representation of this face. Similarly, Calder, Young, Benson, and Perrett (1996) found that in comparison to veridical and anti-caricatured faces, caricatured faces increase the speed of deciding whether a name is familiar or not (i.e. self-priming) -a nding that has been interpreted as demonstrating caricature advantage. While these ndings tend to support the con gurational hypothesis, the following studies cast doubts. Rhodes and Tremewan (1994) tested whether holistic inversion impairs caricatures. If caricatures change con gurational information, then one may hypothesize that inversion will impair recognition of caricatures. The results did not support this hypothesis. It is possible, therefore, that the effects of caricatures arise from their distinctiveness, which results from the distortions that caricatures create in a face. Carey's (1992) data do not support this possible interpretation, since it was easier to identify anti-caricatures than lateral caricatures. (A lateral caricature is a special kind of caricature that increases the distance between a point on the norm face (N) and a point on the target face (F) in the following way. If we assume that the distance between N and F is N----------F, then (1) a 50% caricature is created when this distance is increased by half (N---------------F) , (2) a 50% anti-caricature is created when this distance is decreased by half (F-----N), and (3) a 50% lateral caricature is created when F is moved by half of this distance but at a right angle to the vector connecting N and F.) Although the lateral face changed by an amount identical to the caricatures and anti-caricatures, the lateral face was identi ed most poorly. This nding supports the norm-based coding hypothesis or model, and not the distinctiveness hypothesis. In addition, Rhodes, Byatt, Tremewan, and Kennedy (1996) found that recognition of caricatures is independent of the initial distinctiveness of the face of which the caricature was made. However, note that Benson and Perrett (1994) found that recognition of caricatures of typical faces requires a higher degree of caricaturing than distinctive faces.
Consequently, Rhodes et al. (1998) tested which of the following two hypotheses or models was more tting to the results of an experiment in which participants were shown caricatures, anti-caricatures and lateral faces: the norm-based coding model or the absolute coding (exemplar-based) model. (These models are based on Valentine's, 1991a Valentine's, , 1991b , multidimensional face space framework. In contrast with the norm-based coding model described above, the absolute coding model posits that a face is represented as a point in this space.) The results supported the absolute coding model. For example, one of the most important results that can be explained only by the norm-based coding model, in which anti-caricatures are better identi ed than lateral caricatures, was not obtained in this experiment. The results were interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that caricatures increase the degree of distinctiveness of a face, a condition that leads to enhanced remembering. Still, it should be stressed that in this experiment the result called caricature advantage, in which caricatures are better identi ed than veridical representation, was not obtained either. The authors note that apparently expertise is a necessary condition for obtaining such results. For example, Rhodes and McLean (1990) found that caricature advantage in drawings of birds only in participants who were ornithologists.
One reason for the inconsistencies in the ndings regarding distinctiveness and caricatures may be that distinctiveness itself is a relational concept involving deviations from a norm face. Another reason, a partial one, is that the lateral caricatures used by Carey (1992) were incorrectly scaled to the norm (see Moscovitch, Winocur, & Behrmann, 1997 ; note 1; Rhodes et al., 1998 Rhodes et al., , p. 2309 .
Prototype formation
The norm-based hypothesis assumes that the facial norm or prototype is created in a cognitive system as a result of extensive exposure to, and interaction with, a very large number of faces. The experiments attempt to discover how a prototype is created and the place of featural-con gurational information in this process. Several studies show the 'prototype effect' according to which presentation of a series of faces at the learning stage generates a central value, a prototype, which is identi ed at the test stage as a face that had appeared at the learning stage, even if it was in fact a new face. That is, the imaginary prototype, the entire existence of which was in the participant's mind, was identi ed as a real face that had been seen earlier.
The results of Solso and McCarthy's (1981) experiment showed that human memory may compose previous facial representations into an entirely new representation, which is mistakenly identi ed as a face seen previously. At the learning stage participants were shown three faces composed of three out of the four features (hair, eyes, nose and chin, and mouth) of the prototype (a 75% face), four 50% faces and three 25% faces (the prototype was not shown at this stage). At the test stage, the participants identi ed the prototype with greater certainty than they identi ed the 75% faces, a result that was repeated after a month and a half. Similarly, Inn, Walden, and Solso (1993) interpret a prototype as composed of the most frequent features, and recognition of the prototype increased with age. Malpass and Hughes (1986) found that the prototype was a new synthesis of facial features that appeared at the learning stage. Furthermore, they found that the mode of these features, from which the prototype was composed, explained the experimental results better than the average.
Bruce, Doyle, Dench, and Burton (1991) showed at the learning stage a series of faces produced by moving the internal features of the face towards the brow or the chin, a manipulation that changes the con guration of the entire face. For example, moving the internal features towards the chin creates a young look, while moving these features towards the hair creates an old look. In these experiments also an imaginary prototype was created, which was identi ed at the test stage as a face that had appeared at the learning stage. They interpreted their results by way of two possible processes: one that creates a prototype, an average based on all similar faces, and another that keeps separate all the faces, the exemplars, that are distinct from each other. (The latter process involves a model that assumes representation in memory is exemplar-or instance-based, and the prototype is that face with the greatest degree of similarity to the other faces in the group.) Cabeza, Bruce, Kato, and Oda (1999) found higher recognition of a prototype when faces are created by varying the location of the internal features within the same view than when the study faces are in different views created by varying head-angle. In accordance with Bruce et al.'s (1991) interpretation, they propose that while an averaging mechanism is responsible to the former nding, an exemplar-based process is responsible to the latter nding.
Expertise in face perception and other forms
The experiments tested whether featural information develops differently from con gurational information. The basic hypothesis, which I call the 'expertise' hypothesis, is that mastery of con gurational information requires lengthy training over a prolonged period (about 10 years for faces or dogs), so its effect on face perception and recognition is later, coming after featural information (see summaries and detailed discussions in Bruce & Young, 1998; Carey, 1992 Carey, , 1996 Carey & Diamond, 1994; Chung & Thomson, 1995; Ellis, 1992; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Johnson & Ellis, 1995; Stevenage, 1995a; Tanaka & Gauthier, 1997) . It is noteworthy that a considerable number of these studies describe different and variegated processes in the development of face perception and memory; I shall not discuss these processes here as they touch on our topic only slightly.
The ndings are equivocal, as is, therefore, the support for the expertise hypothesis. In general, it may be said that even infants show sensitivity to the human face, and with age face recognition becomes better (at about age 12 there is a certain decline in remembering). These are basic ndings. The question is whether this development is based on differential development of featural and con gurational information. Compared with na ¨ve participants (e.g. children who are not experts in facial con guration), do experts (e.g. participants aged 10 and older) evince more intense use of con gurational information in appropriate and commonly accepted tests? Note here that although most studies assume that children up to age 10 are na ¨ve, not all studies support this assumption. For example, Ellis (1992) reports that compared with older children (10 and older), younger children actually perceive a caricature of a famous face as representing this face. This nding runs counter to the expertise hypothesis.
While Stevenage (1995a) suggested two tests for expertise, holistic inversion and caricature advantage, I examine a wider range of tests and effects, such as composite faces and the whole/part advantage. By means of these tests, two principal questions linked to the expertise hypothesis were examined: (1) Do experts and non-experts differ in perception and remembering of faces? (2) Do they differ in perception and remembering of faces and of non-facial objects?
Faces
The phenomenon that inversion of the face impedes face recognition in adults more than in children is considered as evidence for the featural to con gurational development (e.g. Carey & Diamond, 1977; Goldstein, 1975; Goldstein & Chance, 1980) . Carey and Diamond (1977) found that children up to age 10 recognized inverted faces as well as upright faces, and that they tended to rely on items (paraphernalia), such as a hat or scarf, far more than adults. They interpreted these and other ndings as supporting the expertise hypothesis that from age 10 a transition occurs from reliance on featural information to reliance on con gurational information in face recognition. However, these ndings do not harmonize with several facts which indicated, among other things, that children perceive and remember faces holistically, and that adults too use featural information (e.g. Baenninger, 1994; Flin, 1985; Pedelty, Levine, & Shevell, 1985) . Following Carey and Diamond (1977) , Baenninger (1994) conducted several experiments, and found that adults and children relied more on con gurational than featural information in face recognition. Carey (1992 Carey ( , 1996 and Carey and Diamond (1994) tried to test the expertise hypothesis by use of a composite face. If indeed a transition occurs in face perception from childhood to adulthood, then we should expect that the impediment to identi cation of the upper part of a composite face will be greater in adults than in children, because adults rely on con gurational information far more than children. Carey and Diamond (1994) found that the composite face effect was obtained to the same degree in children aged 6 and 10 as in adults, for both known and unknown faces. The expertise hypothesis, then, does not win support from this test. In contrast, these researchers found that children were not in uenced by holistic inversion of composite faces in the way that adults were.
The fact that these two effects, composite face and inversion, are independent of each other led Carey and Diamond (1994) to suggest two processes in face recognition: one is holistic coding, expressed in the composite face effect and in the whole/part advantage, and the other is expertise, expressed in the inversion effect. As holistic coding is not connected to expertise, Carey and Diamond (1994) suggest that Tanaka and Farah's (1993) whole/part advantage should also be obtained for all ages. Tanaka (in a personal communication to Carey and Diamond (1994) ) reported that this result was indeed obtained in an experiment. Recently, Tanaka, Kay, Grinnell, Stans eld, and Szechter (1998) used the whole/part advantage procedure and found that indeed children and adults encode faces holistically. Hence, these ndings do not support the hypothesis regarding the transition from featural information to con gurational.
Non-face forms
If in experts of non-face forms we obtain effects similar to experts in faces, then it becomes possible to suggest a uniform explanation for all the facial and non-facial effects by a general visual process, which undergoes specialization for complex visual stimuli that share a common con guration. Empirical results are not unequivocal, as we shall see below.
The inversion effect and sensitivity to con gurational information were found in experts on dogs and birds (e.g. Diamond & Carey, 1986; Rhodes & McLean, 1990; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991) . However, Tanaka, Giles, Szechter, Lantz, Stone, Franks, and Vastine (as reported in Tanaka & Gauthier, 1997) found that experts in biological cells, cars and dogs' faces responded in a test of the whole/part effect like na ¨ve participants. That is, expertise did not seem to have an effect on holistic recognition. This lack of uniformity of ndings may stem from the fact that in daily life it is dif cult to make a clear-cut distinction between experts and non-experts. Therefore, special interest lies in the series of experiments conducted by Isabel Gauthier and her colleagues, who tested the expertise hypothesis by means of arti cial and computerized creatures called 'greebles' (e.g. Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Gauthier, Williams, Tarr, & Tanaka, 1998; Tanaka & Gauthier, 1997) . Here the expertise variable can be controlled experimentally.
The greebles themselves are three-dimensional objects whose degree of complexity is somewhat like that of a face. They consist of a body on which are mounted three parts that can be changed, as can the spatial relations between them. Gauthier and Tarr (1997) tested whether, compared with na ¨ve participants, experts (i.e. participants who had been thoroughly and extensively trained (for 7-10 hours) in distinguishing and identifying greebles) would evince similar behaviour in face recognition in a test of Tanaka and Farah's (1993) whole/part advantage and of Tanaka and Sengco's (1997) old/new con gurational advantage, described above. The ndings were partly similar: in the test of the whole/part advantage, namely a condition in which a certain part of a greeble was shown in the setting of the original greeble (which had appeared in the learning stage), recognition was better than in the condition where the part appeared alone (although other results led the researchers to suggest that not expertise but a property of the greebles' group themselves was behind this result); and in the test of the old/new con gurational advantages, the speed at which a part of the greeble was recognized in a condition where this part appeared in the setting of the original greeble, was faster than in the condition where the greeble setting had undergone spacing. These results were obtained with greebles presented upright, not inverted. Gauthier et al. (1998) replicated and expanded these results partially. No clear-cut differences were found between experts and na ¨ve participants in the two tests of Tanaka and his colleagues, except with one out of the three parts of the greebles. A difference was found between expert and na ¨ve participants in the composite test and in the inversion test, and even in the recognition of 'negative greebles' where light and shade were reversed. In all these cases similar results to those in tests with faces were obtained.
In sum, it seems that there is some support for the expertise hypothesis since experts in both non-face objects and in faces occasionally behave alike in memory tasks.
Discussion

Hypotheses and ndings: Four dif culties
Given the above ndings, can one discern the hypotheses that have been refuted or the most ef cient hypothesis that account for most of the ndings? I think not. There are two major reasons for this conclusion: rst, no hypothesis has received a coup de grâce, and secondly, there are four conceptual and methodological problems that seem to interfere with proposing a straightforward answer to this question.
The results of the studies reviewed here do not support any of the above hypotheses unequivocally. Consider the con gurational hypothesis: some of the above ndings regarding featural exchange, spacing and sizing, low spatial frequencies, composite face effects, inversion effects and caricatures do not support this hypothesis. For example, low spatial frequencies are not the only source for face perception: holistic inversion impairs recognition of isolated features too, it does not eliminate the feeling of strangeness in all of the variations of the Thatcher illusion and it does not impair recognition of caricatures. It is not clear that caricatures alter only con gurational information, and expertise does not affect composite face recognition. Similar things can be said about the other hypotheses (for details see the above review). In fact, all of the above hypotheses won empirical support to some degree, in some task or other, and no experiment delivered the coup de grâce to any one of the hypotheses.
There seem to be two major reasons for this state of affairs. First, the results support the hypothesis that in face perception and remembering, all kinds of information are of great importance-featural, con gurational, holistic and normative. The results cannot be explained by featural information, con gurational, holistic or norm information alone. I discuss this idea in the next section. The second reason stems from four conceptual and methodological problems, which, as mentioned above, pose dif culties in inferring unambiguous experimental conclusions.
The 'intrinsic connection' problem
An important element, discussed at the beginning of the article, which makes it dif cult to answer our question, is the dif culty in de ning the two terms, featural and con gurational information-namely, if every con gurational change alters featural information, and vice versa, then no wonder it is hard to answer our questions. 1 However, it is possible that this dif culty is theoretical, and that in practice it is possible to discriminate between featural and con gurational information (e.g. Bartlett & Searcy, 1993; Leder & Bruce, 1998a , 1998b Rhodes et al., 1993; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996) . While this suggestion may be useful, note that, in these experiments, changing an individual feature to make it salient could transform a recognition task into a detection task, which is easy to perform even under holistic inversion.
Holistic inversion
One of the most important experimental manipulations that appears in most of the experiments reviewed above is holistic inversion. The basic assumption is that inversion conceals con gurational and holistic information, but does not affect featural information. This assumption is used to explain a fairly large number of effects. The question raised (i.e. the 'inversion question') is why should inversion conceal con gurational information? Clearly nothing has changed in the facial stimulus when the face is turned upside down. Even if we move the eyes farther apart, place the nose nearer to or farther from the mouth, or join two different parts of faces into one composite face, inversion of the face still will not change a thing in the stimulus pattern itself. What changes is something in the viewer's cognitive system. The change is in the observer, not in the inverted stimulus. The question is, what is it that changes in the cognitive system? All answers to this question, in one form or another, are lodged in the everyday fact that from birth we are exposed to an enormous number of faces that appear before our eyes upright (e.g. Bruce, 1988; Goldstein & Chance, 1980; Rock, 1973 Rock, , 1974 Valentine, 1988 Valentine, , 1991a Valentine, , 1991b . However, except for adding this observation to the assumption that inversion impairs con gurational information, researchers did not propose detailed solutions to the inversion question. For example, Diamond and Carey (1986) , as stated, suggested three conditions for the inversion effect in any group of objects: (1) sharing a common con guration; (2) individuation of different objects belonging to the same category according to the 2nd-orp; and (3) expertise in (2). However, they too did not discuss in detail the process responsible for the elimination of con gurational information by holistic inversion. Given the importance of this manipulation, if we do not know why and how a certain process impairs only con gurational information, then it would be dif cult to answer our question.
Nevertheless, there are few proposals that can be viewed as preliminary attempts to answer the inversion question. More cells in the temporal cortex of the monkey are tuned to upright orientation than to inverted orientation. The former cells display greater ease of recognition than the latter cells. Some of the cells in the temporal cortex are sensitive to con guration and they respond less to jumbled face or body parts (for a review and discussion see Perrett & Ashbridge, 1998) . Rock (1973 Rock ( , 1974 suggests that in the attempt to cope with an inverted face, the cognitive system is hard-pressed to accomplish mental rotation of all parts of the face; and Goldstein and Chance (1980) suggest that a developed schema suffers from rigidity, which prevents the schema from coping ef ciently with an inverted face. Following these proposals and the hierarchy of schemas hypothesis, I suggest that schemas, which exist in our cognitive system, can cause errors in recognition of inverted faces, since we perceive and interpret visual stimuli according to these schemas. When a face is inverted, we try to cope with it by matching the face to schemas that have developed for faces and features that are upright. We scan the inverted face's salient features and organize them within the most suitable schema. As an illustration of this suggestion, consider the 'cat-woman' in Fig. 2 . Fig. 2 shows visual stimulus perceived as the face of a woman. But when this stimulus is inverted, though nothing has been changed in the stimulus itself, we do not see the inverted face of a woman: rather we see a new con guration of a cat. We see a cat because the salient features of the inverted gure are organized within a cat schema. Anyone who never in his life had had the pleasure of seeing cats, lions or leopards would not perceive this con guration as the face of a cat. (Note here that such a double inversion effect (man -woman) appears also in Rock (1974, p. 85 ). Rock does not interpret this effect as I do, but as supporting the hypothesis that faces are recognized on the basis of their upright retinal orientation.)
Shared con guration and norm
A very important argument states that because all faces share the same con guration, the distinction between different faces comes about by means of con gurational information and the relationship between a face and the facial norm (e.g. Diamond & Carey, 1986; Rhodes, 1996) . Although this assumption has empirical support, the following problems are worth noting.
First, the inversion effect is obtained also in stimuli that do not share a common con guration such as print or handwriting (e.g. Bruyer & Crispeels, 1992) .
Second, not only do human faces share the same con guration, so do the faces of monkeys. Yet for all that, one would not tend to say that the distinction between human and monkey faces is made principally by means of con gurational information. (Note here that regarding pictures of faces of people, monkeys and gorillas, Phelps and Roberts (1994) found that the inversion effect occurs in people and monkeys, but not in pigeons.) I suggest, therefore, according to the hierarchy of schemas hypothesis, that much of the distinction between different faces is owing to the variability of every facial dimension (e.g. different noses and mouths). That is, faces are also distinguished by the kind of features they possess.
Third, how does one determine shared con guration? In order to answer this question one has to determine rst what is meant by common con guration: everyday facial features, types of grey surfaces, types of lines and contours, etc. The problem is, how far do these possibilities play a role in face perception and memory. Norm and prototype are theoretical concepts intended to describe some abstract facial pattern (e.g. the average) representing a group of faces. As the facial norm is a calculated, abstract concept, the following problem arises. Since the norm can be applied to every face, it transpires that any change in the target face simultaneously creates a change in respect of the norm. For example, assume that the norm distance between the eyes is 2.5 cm, that the distance between the eyes of the target face is 2 cm, and that we set them 6 cm apart. This spacing simultaneously changes both the speci c con guration of the target face owing to the additional 4 cm separation, and the con guration of the target face in relation to the norm owing to the creation of an additional difference of 3.5 cm. The question is, which of these two changes in uences perception and memory of the face?
Operational de nitions
The studies reviewed above start from operational assumptions about the connection between experimental manipulations and the featural and con gurational facial information. For example, as stated, the researchers assume that spacing, holistic inversion and the Thatcher illusion are associated with con gurational information, while featural exchange, isolated presentation, sizing and jumbled face are associated with featural information. While the operational de nition allows researchers to get on with the job, it is not based on so solid a connection between theoretical concepts and observations as, for example, the connection in physics between the concept of distance and the observation. In psychology, the connection between the theoretical concept and the observation is based on common sense, previous experimental results and theoretical implications (see discussion in Rakover, 1990) . Tanaka and Farah (1993) and Tanaka and Sengco (1997) attempted to close the concept-observation gap and to operationally de ne holistic recognition in terms of the whole/part advantage procedure, described above, in which identi cation of an isolated feature is compared with identi cation of this feature when it appears in the setting of the target face (e.g. Tanaka et al., 1998, p. 481; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997, p. 583) . This raises a problem, since it is not clear how to treat new results generated by a slightly different procedure. According to this strict operational de nition approach, a different procedure captures a different theoretical concept or process. However, if the operational de nition suggests only a partial interpretation of the theoretical process, new ndings do not necessitate the new theoretical process and they may be interpreted in terms of the original theoretical process (e.g. Rakover, 1990) .
In sum, it seems dif cult to answer the question regarding the relation between hypotheses and empirical ndings for the following reasons. There is an intrinsic connection between featural and con gurational information; it is not clear why holistic inversion eliminates con gurational and holistic information; the conceptual de nitions of shared con guration and norm are vague; and the operational de nition of holistic recognition is too narrow.
Future research
While one option for researchers is to continue to design experiments aimed at a de nitive answer to our question, I think that other approaches may be more pro table.
In this section, I suggest two directions for future research. The rst is to develop what I call the 'task-information' approach, and the second is to look for new methods for discovering how the cognitive system represents facial information. One example of such a new important method is 'Principal Component Analysis' (PCA) (for other examples see Biederman & Kalocsai, 1998; Hancock, Bruce, & Burton, 1998) . In the present section, I brie y discuss the latter two possibilities, since they attempt to handle multiplicity of facial information that may propose solutions to part of the above dif culties.
An outline of the 'task-information' approach As mentioned above, it seems reasonable to assume that the cognitive system uses all kinds of facial information at its disposal to cope with a given perceptual and memory task. I believe that a fairly elaborate triple interaction exists among the cognitive processes, the facial information and the kinds of experimental manipulations and tasks used. This triple interaction is handled by other theoretical approaches as well (e.g. Bruce & Young, 1986) . A major difference between Bruce and Young's model and the task-information approach is in the emphasis on components. Both deal with the information that can be extracted from a face, but while Bruce and Young's model laid more emphasis on the appropriate cognitive processes, the task-information approach stresses the importance of the tasks.
Certain studies in the literature can be interpreted as attempting to uncover the nature of the triple interaction as well as the task-information interaction. In some studies, a theoretical effort was made to predict when con gurational and holistic information will be used, and when featural information will be used. For example, Bartlett and Searcy (1993) , Rhodes et al. (1993) , Leder and Bruce (1998a) and Searcy and Bartlett (1996) , who support the dual (featural and con gurational) hypothesis about representation of facial information, found that spacing and the Thatcher illusion were associated with con gurational information, while a jumbled face, isolated features and changes in isolated features were associated with featural information. Tanaka and Farah (1993) and Tanaka and Sengco (1997) , who support the holistic hypothesis, found that identi cation of a facial feature was better in the setting of the original face than in the setting that had undergone spacing or than identi cation of an isolated feature. Furthermore, Tanaka and Sengco suggest that superiority studies and whole/part advantage studies are based on two different processes, mainly because with the superiority effects one does not obtain the whole/part advantage, whereby recognition of part of the face in the setting of the face is higher than recognition of the isolated part, and because similar results were obtained for objects and words for which shared con guration could not be found (e.g. Enns & Gilani, 1988; Wheeler, 1970) . Nevertheless, Tanaka and Gauthier (1997) believe that it is still dif cult to nd a simple explanation for the ndings indicating that the whole/part advantage is obtained with such stimuli as upright faces, biological cells, cars and greebles, but not with stimuli such as jumbled and inverted faces, houses and faces of dogs.
In some studies, researchers tried to reveal the nature of the interaction between expertise, and con gurational and holistic information. Tanaka and Gauthier (1997) suggest that while sensitivity to con gurational changes is a function of expertise, the whole/part advantage occurs in both na ¨ve and expert participants; Rhodes and Tremewan (1994) hold that while the caricature advantage effect is obtained among experts with faces presented upright, the caricature equivalence effect does not require expertise and appears in upright and inverted faces; and Carey (1996) and Carey and Diamond (1994) propose that the composite face effect is not associated with age, while the facial inversion effect is a function of expertise. These researchers call the expertise variable the 'mystery factor', and suggest that while con gurational and holistic information is coded from an early age, expertise is based on coding in relation to the facial norm, which develops over time and is expressed in the inversion effect.
In the same vein, illustrating the interaction between memory tasks and cognitive processes, Wells and Hryciw (1984) found that while character assessments of faces improved recall in a recognition test, physical assessments of facial features were helpful in a test of target-face reconstruction, a test based on the application of the identikit technique. These authors believed that character assessments are suitable for recognition processes, and facial feature assessments are suitable for face reconstruction with the identikit. Wells and Turtle (1988) expanded this hypothesis and found accordingly that while assessment of the facial character improved the accuracy of face recognition, assessment of facial features enhanced accuracy in the verbal description of the face.
Finally, note that Cabeza et al. (1999) propose two different processes (averaging mechanism and approximation mechanism) for prototype generation, depending on the tasks to be performed.
In view of the above, how may one proceed in developing the task-information approach? While a complete answer is beyond the scope of the present article, I propose that the following should be taken into consideration. A task, which displays a face, presents a particular question that can be answered by appeal to particular facial information. For example, the question 'What is the emotional state of this face?' demands an answer different from the question 'Is this Ruth's face?' The task's demand can be answered from the information supplied by the face. The issue is then whether the face does supply the information demanded by the task. Hence, the match between the task's demand and the information supplied by the face is an important factor in the cognitive processes of a person observing a face (i.e. in the developing of the task-information approach). Similarly, Schyns (1998) developed a theoretical framework, called diagnostic recognition, whereby the interaction between task constraints (the visual information needed by the task to classify the presented object into perceptual categories) and object information (information that the object provides, e.g. shape and colour) creates diagnostic clues by means of which recognition is accomplished. As a simple example, one may look at the change in the importance of nose length for various tasks. When the task is identi cation of a person (Mary) from a pro le, nose length will be of great importance because Mary has a long nose. But if the task is to decide if the picture is a human face or not, nose length will be of slight importance.
Facial representation: Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
In many respects, the problem of featural vs. con gurational information in faces discussed above stems from the following predetermined theoretical approach: we tend to perceive facial features and their con guration in terms of their linguistic description. Can we circumvent this approach and by this, hopefully, also circumvent the featural vs. con gurational problem? PCA seems to suggest an af rmative answer, since PCA does not determine the facial features and their con guration a priori, but a posteriori, on the basis of a statistical analysis of multidimensional facial information.
While a description of PCA is far beyond the scope of this article, the following brief discussion gives the reader the general idea of this method and its relevance to the article's topics (for a description and mathematical discussion see Jordan, 1986; Turk & Pentland, 1991; Valentin, Abdi, O'Toole, & Cottrell, 1994 ; for a lucid description of PCA see Dunteman, 1989) . PCA is a statistical method, which may be described and formulated as a neural net, and which is designed to treat multidimensional information-information obtained from a large number of measurements conducted on a large number of people. This method is somewhat similar to others, for example factor analysis and discriminant analysis. These methods provide economical ways of reducing multidimensional information to a number of variables, dimensions and factors, which are similar to principal components.
In general, PCA suggests a way of converting a large collection of N variables, which are interdependent in a high correlational relationship (over a large number of participants) to a small group of K independent variables (K < N), namely principal components (called eigenvectors or eigenfaces), so that this small group will represent appropriately the information represented by N. First, the PCA is presented with a large number of faces, namely computerized face images, and then it derives a number of principal components that differentiate among these face images and give the best t between the derived facial information and the original information.
The PCA neural-net model is able to suggest explanations to a number of interesting facial effects such as the discrimination between old and new faces, the other-race effect, and the reconstruction of a whole face from a face with hidden parts (e.g. the eye area) (See e.g. Hancock, Burton, & Bruce, 1996; O'Toole, Abdi, Deffenbacher, & Valentin, 1995; O'Toole, Deffenbacher, Valentin, & Abdi, 1994; Turk & Pentland, 1991; Valentin, Abdi, O'Toole, & Cottrell, 1994) . This success establishes the model not only as a satisfactory and promising way of understanding face recognition, but also a way of discovering the important dimensions whereby it is possible to represent faces. Furthermore, PCA, as a method of representation of facial information, can be applied and contributed to models of face recognition. For example, PCA instantiates the dimensions in Valentine's (1991a Valentine's ( , 1991b ) multidimensional face space model, and furnishes the inputs of facial information in the IAC neural-net model of Burton, Bruce, and Hancock (1999) .
In summary, what are the main conclusions of this review? The following three points should be stressed. First, it seems that it is very dif cult to attain the goal of explaining all facial phenomena by appeal to one kind of facial information such as featural or con gurational. Secondly, there are four obstacles to achieving this explanatory goal: the intrinsic connection, the holistic inversion, the shared con guration and norm, and the operational de nition. And nally, future research should consider the following two lines of research: (1) the task-information approach that stresses that the cognitive system uses different kinds of facial information so as to satisfy the informational demands of different tasks; and (2) the statistical method PCA that provides a new way to represent visual facial information that has been found very ef cient in explaining many effects of face perception and recognition.
